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Real business cycle (RBC) theory has been successful in 
simulating the variability of and comovements among aggregate 
variables, such as output, consumption, and investment.  However, 
in order to generate the observed movements in employment over 
the business cycle, RBC models have had to produce highly 
procyclical real wages.'  This is inconsistent with data showing 
that real wages are either slightly procyclical or acyclical. 
This paper presents a one-period, two-sector model that 
reconciles large movements in employment and output with 
acyclical real wages.  The two sectors,  which can be thought of 
as durables and services, differ in their cyclical sensitivities. 
The shocks to both sectors are positively correlated,  but the 
shock to durables has a larger variance than the shock to 
services.  In this type of stochastic environment,  workers move 
from the durables sector to the service sector during downturns 
and from the service sector to the durables sector during 
upturns. 
The model presented here is motivated by Rogerson (1986), who 
studies an infinite-horizon two-sector model.  One of the sectors 
is high growth (low cyclical sensitivity, interpreted as 
services), while the other is low growth (high cyclical 
sensitivity, interpreted as durables).  Rogerson shows that this 
As pointed out by Barro (1989,  p.  8),  It.. . the (RBC) 
models tend to overstate the procyclical patterns of hours, 
productivity, real interest rates and real wage rates." 
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from durables to services during downturns.  Empirical evidence 
reported by Loungani and Rogerson  (1988) supports this finding. 
We modify Rogersonls  environment to account for the acyclical 
behavior of wages.  For simplicity, we present a one-period, two- 
sector model that captures the sectoral reallocation process 
discussed in the earlier study.  However, unlike Rogersonls  model, 
ours assumes that firms face a fixed cost of hiring workers, 
which in turn generates a magnification effect.'  In other 
words, the size of the sectoral shock needed to generate a given 
amount of sectoral reallocation is smaller in the presence of a 
fixed hiring cost.  This I1magnification  effect1#  causes wages to 
be less procyclical, because additional workers flowing into the 
service sector tend to depress wages there. 
If the economy experiences a negative productivity shock, 
workers move from the durable goods sector to the service sector, 
and as they do, more firms in the service sector find it 
worthwhile to incur the fixed cost of hiring some of the incoming 
workers.  With an increase in the number of service-sector firms 
hiring, each firm hires fewer workers, thus mitigating the real 
wage decline in that sector.  Because the real wage in the 
service sector declines by  less than it would in the absence of a 
fixed cost of hiring, additional workers find it advantageous to 
Alternatively, this effect can be generated by assuming 
that the number of firms producing is exogenous and that there 
exists a fixed cost of entering into production (see Chatterjee 
and Cooper [1988, 19891). 
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the number of workers leaving the durables sector causes the real 
wage in that sector to decline by  less than it would have without 
the presence of fixed costs. 
The magnification effect generated by  our model is similar to 
that reported by  Chatterjee and Cooper (1988, 1989).  Their work 
is specifically aimed at generating large output effects from 
small shocks in economies with endogenous entry and exit, and is 
part of a growing body of literature that demonstrates how 
economies can exhibit Keynesian-type features such as multiple 
equilibria and magnification effects (see  Diamond  [I9881 and 
Cooper and John [1988]). 
Although our model exhibits magnification effects, it differs 
from Chatterjee and Cooper's work in that we do not construct an 
economy with multiple equilibria.  Our eventual goal is to embed 
this type of model into an RBC model in order to generate data 
that can be matched with real-world observations. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section I1 describes the 
model.  Section I11 presents simulations of the model and 
analyzes the results.  Section IV discusses extensions of our 
framework and concludes. 
11.  The Model 
 his section presents a one-period, two-sector, general 
equilibrium model in which the firmls  decision to hire and the 
workerls  decision to stay or to relocate are endogenous.  Labor 
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hiring cost. 
The existence of this fixed cost produces a nonconvexity in 
the firm's hiring decision; that is, firms will not hire 
additional workers until the payoff exceeds the fixed cost.  Once 
this threshold is exceeded, the firm hires workers until wages 
equal the marginal productivity of labor.  This nonconvexity 
leads to both the magnification effect and a real wage that is 
less procyclical. 
The timing of decisions in this economy is as follows. 
Workers are initially allocated to one of the two sectors: 
durables or services.  One can think of this initial allocation 
as being determined by the demand conditions in the previous 
period.  For simplicity, we assume that N workers are allocated 
to each firm and that there are an equal number of firms in each 
sector.  Prior to production, firms and workers observe the state 
of the economy, i.e.,  they observe the productivity shocks as 
well as the demand conditions in each ~ector.~  Simultaneously, 
workers decide where to work and firms decide whether to incur 
the fixed cost of hiring.  Once these variables are determined, 
Examples of a fixed cost of hiring are placing an ad in 
Job Openinss for Economists, renting a hotel room for 
interviewing at the American Economic Association meetings, or 
hiring a personnel service. 
Our model allows sectoral reallocation to take place 
either as a result of productivity differences or of taste 
differences between the sectors. The latter is what we refer to 
as the demand conditions. 
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shocks such that, in equilibrium, workers will move from the 
durable goods sector to the service sector, and only firms in the 
service sector hire additional workers. 
We repeat this one-period game for several different 
realizations of the productivity shocks to each sector.  We then 
compute the variances of wages, output, and employment and 
compare these to  the case in which firms do not face a fixed cost 
of hiring. 
Consumption 
We assume that the economy is populated by a large number of 
identical consumers, each of whom lives for one period.  A 
representative consumer is initially located in one of the two 
sectors: the S-sector  (services)  or the D-sector  (durables). 
Prior to production, the consumer observes the productivity shock 
to each sector and decides whether to stay and produce or move to 
the other sector and produce.  There are no fixed costs 
associated with moving; however, the  worker who moves faces an 
exogenous probability of finding a production opportunity 
(employment)  in the other sector. 
A  representative worker chooses a sector to  work in and the 
quantities of the S-good  (C,)  and the D-good  (C,)  in order to 
maximize the following utility function: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwhere 0 5  6 I  1  and y  1 1.  We restrict y  to be greater than or 
equal to one because we only consider movements from durables to 
services. 
The representative worker faces the usual constraint that the 
sum of  the quantities Cs and C,  multiplied by their respective 
prices is less than or equal to the wage.  For simplicity,  we 
assume that individuals in this economy have no utility for 
leisure. 
Production 
Production in both sectors is carried out by  a large number of 
perfectly competitive firms.  Each firm is initially endowed with 
N workers, and labor is the only input in the production process. 
The production functions in both sectors exhibit diminishing 
marginal product and are identical except for a multiplicative 
shock. 
A representative firm faces the decision of whether to produce 
with its initial allocation of workers or to incur a fixed cost 
and hire additional workers.  Formally, the profit function for 
the representative firm in the S-sector that decides not to hire 
any additional workers is as follows: 
The implications of relaxing this assumption are explored 
in section IV. 
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is the price of output in the S-sector, and  E,  is a random 
productivity shock. 
Firms in the S-sector that decide to  hire additional workers 
have the following profit function: 
where 8 is the proportion of D-sector workers who move to the S- 
sector, q is the exogenous probability of finding employment in 
the S-sector, h is the fraction of firms in the S-sector that 
decide to incur the fixed cost in order to  hire the incoming 
workers, and k is the fixed cost of hiring measured in units of 
the S-good.  The quantity 8q/h is thus the number of additional 
workers that will be employed by those firms in the S-sector that 
decide to  hire. 
Since we consider only movements from the D-sector to the S- 
sector, the profit function for the representative D-sector firm 
is simply: 
where E~  is the productivity shock to  the D-sector, WD is the 
wage paid  in the D-sector, and PD is the price of output in the 
D-sector . 
Since output and labor markets are perfectly competitive and 
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social planner's problem.  In order to maximize the utility of a 
representative consumer subject to the production constraints, 
the social planner chooses consumption in the S-sector  (C,), 
consumption in the D-sector  (C,),  the proportion of workers 
moving from the D-sector to the S-sector (0), and the proportion 
of firms hiring in the S-sector (h).  Formally: 
subject to 
C,  = heS[N(1 +  0q/h)  J"  +  (1 - h)e,N"  - hk, and 
CD  =  eDIN(l - 0)  1". 
Constraint (6) shows that the total amount of the S-good 
produced  (per consumer) is equal to the proportion produced by 
the hiring firms {heS[N(1 +  Oq/h)Ja)  and the nonhiring firms [(I- 
h)  E,N"]  less the fixed cost of hiring  (hk).  We normalized the 
number of firms to be equal to one.  Constraint  (7) is simply 
total output of firms in the D-sector. 
Carrying out this maximization yields the following first 
order conditions: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcDb-l  =  I,,  (9) 
es[N(l  +  0q/h)  la - eSNa  = aeSIN(l +  0q/h)  la-l~0q/h  +  k,  (10) 
~,a€,[N(l +  eq/h) la-'q  = I,a[N(l  - 0)  la-',  (11) 
C,  = heS[N(1  +  0q/h)Ia +  (1 - h)eSNa - hk, and  (12 
CD =  eDIN(l - 0)  laf  (13) 
where I, and I, are the Lagrange multipliers associated with 
constraints (6) and  (7), respectively.  First order conditions 
(8) and (9) are the usual marginal utility conditions. 
To understand equations (10) and (ll), consider the following 
decentralized version of the social planner's problem in which we 
interpret I, to be the price of the S-good, P,,  and I, to be the 
price of the D-good, PD.  Using this convention, first order 
condition (11) states that expected real wages (measured in 
utility units) are equal across sectors. 
Equation (10) is the result of maximizing with respect to the 
number of firms hiring in the S-sector, h.  To see the intuition 
behind this condition, consider the outcome of the maximization 
problem faced by an individual firm in the economy.  Firms that 
choose to incur the fixed cost of hiring do so up to the point 
where the return from hiring additional workers is equal to the 
cost: 
The left side of this equation is the difference between 
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simply the fixed cost of hiring.  Multiplying equation  (10)  by A, 
(P,)  and recognizing that W,  =  A,ar~,[N(l  +  8q/h)  la-',  this 
condition can be solved to yield first order condition (10). 
Equations  (10)  and  (14)  state that profits of firms that do hire 
nh  must be equal to profits of firms that do not hire, or ash  =  T, . 
Although the structure of this model is quite simple, the 
first order conditions are highly nonlinear and cannot be solved 
for reduced-form expressions.  As an alternative to an analytical 
solution, we parameterize this economy and simulate the behavior 
of wages, employment, and output for various realizations of the 
productivity shocks E,  and E,. 
111.  Simulations 
The purpose of this section is twofold.  First, we briefly 
describe the technique used to simulate the model presented in 
section 11.  Second, we present the results from several 
simulations of the model and the intuition behind them.6 
As shown in the appendix, first order conditions (8)-(13) can 
be reduced to a system of two equations in two unknowns: 8 and h. 
To obtain a measure of the variability of wages, employment, and 
output in this economy, we simulate the solutions to 8 and h for 
numerous realizations of E,  and E,  drawn from a random number 
generator.  The general forms for E,  and E,  are as follows: 
See the appendix for a discussion of the simulation 
technique. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmE,  = m,,  +  B,,ranl,  and 
E,  =  m,,  +  B,,,ranl  +  B,,,ran2, 
where ranl and ran2 are independently distributed uniform random 
variables with mean zero and unit variance.  The parameters m,, 
and m,,  are the means of eS and ED, respectively.  In table 1, we 
choose m,,  > m,,  to generate movements from the D-sector to  the S- 
sector.  The random variable ranl can be interpreted as an 
aggregate productivity shock.  The parameters B,,  and Be,,  measure 
the sensitivity of productivity in the S- and D-sectors to 
changes in aggregate productivity.  The random variable ran2 is a 
sector-specific shock, with Be,,  measuring the importance of that 
shock to the determination of productivity in the D-sector, 
ED 
In table 1, under the subheading "aggregate shockstW  we set 
B,,  <  BED,  and BED,  =  0 to simulate an economy in which productivity 
in both sectors is subject to an aggregate productivity shock, 
but the variance of the productivity shock is greater in the D- 
sector than in the S-sector.  Since m,,  >  m,,,  workers continually 
relocate from the D-sector to the S-sector; however, the bulk of 
this sectoral reallocation occurs during cyclical downturns. 
In table 1, under the subheading I1sectoral  shocks,11  we set BE, 
<  Be,,  and BED,  =  0 to simulate an economy in which productivity in 
each sector is determined by an independent shock. Since m,,  > 
m,,,  workers continually relocate from the D-sector to the S- 
sector.  When a "badu shock hits the D-sector  (or  a good shock 
11 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmhits the S-sector), workers relocate from the D-sector to the S- 
sector. 
Table 2 repeats these experiments with m,,  = m,,,  but y  >  1. 
This causes workers to  move from the D-sector to the S-sector 
because of an increased demand for services. 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results from a subset of the 
simulations performed.  Before examining them in detail, we 
present a brief overview of the parameter settings for each set 
of simulations.  The utility function parameter, 6, is set equal 
to .5, the probability of employment, q, is set equal to 1, and 
the number of workers per firm, N,  is set equal to 1.  We 
experimented with several different values of these parameters 
and found the results to be qualitatively similar to the results 
presented here. 
The simulations presented in tables 1 and 2 show the effects 
of changing the production function parameter, a, and the fixed 
cost of hiring, k.  The simulations are presented in pairs:  For 
each value of a, we present the simulation results when k =  0 and 
k >  0.  To measure the relative variability of wages, employment, 
and output, we compute the coefficient of variation for each of 
these variables for 50 independent draws of the productivity 
shocks E,  and  E,. 
The real wage and real output are measured in utility units.7 
The expressions for real wages and output are contained in 
the appendix. 
12 
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variability in all simulations.  This follows from the fact that 
q =  1.  As seen in equation (ll), the wages in both sectors are 
always equal when the probability of employment  (q) is 1. We 
therefore present the single measure of wage variability under 
the column heading llWage.ll  Real output is denoted by Y.  In 
addition to the coefficients of variation, we also present the 
regression coefficients obtained from regressing the real wage in 
each sector (deviation from mean) on real output  (deviation from 
mean).  Again, only one regression coefficient is presented, 
since the coefficients for each wage regressed on real output are 
identical.  This coefficient is found in the far-right columns of 
tables 1 and 2. 
It should be clear from the structure of the model presented 
in section I1 that sectoral movements in employment (8 >  0) can 
be generated either by differences in the preferences for the S- 
good and D-good, or by differences in the productivity shocks to 
each sector.  The simulations presented in table 1 show the 
effects of different mean productivities in each sector.  In 
particular,  all of these simulations are for the case where m,, 
=  2 and m,,  =  1.  In addition, the utility function parameter y 
is set equal to 1 to eliminate any effects from preferences.  In 
this case, sectoral movement occurs because workers wish to move 
from the low-productivity D-sector to the high-productivity S- 
sector. 
The simulations presented in table 2 are for the case in which 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe sectoral movements in employment are caused by differences in 
the preferences for the S-good and the D-good.  In particular, 
mean productivities m,,  and m,,  are set equal to 1, and the 
utility function parameter y, which measures the weight given to 
the consumption of the S-good, is set equal to 1.2. 
In table 1, the simulations under "aggregate shocksn are for 
the case where B,,,  =  0, so that only the common shock ran1 
generates movements in productivity in both sectors.  In 
addition, to capture the relative variability of shocks to the S- 
and D-sectors, we set B,,  =  .05 and B,,,  =  .l.  In other words, we 
assume that D-sector productivity is twice as variable as S- 
sector productivity.  The simulations under llsectoral  shocks11  are 
for the case where the D-sector experiences a productivity shock 
that is independent of the aggregate shock.  For these 
simulations, the productivity shock parameters are as follows: 
B,,  =  .05, B,,,  =  0, and B,,,  =  .l.  The shocks for the simulations 
in table 2 are identical in terms of B,,,  B,,,,  and B,,,;  the only 
difference is that m,,  =  mCD =  1. 
Results 
All of the simulations exhibit both the magnification effect 
and dampening of the real wage in the presence of a fixed hiring 
cost.  For example, in table 1, the first pair of simulations 
under the heading Ifaggregate  shocksu shows that increasing the 
fixed costs from 0 to .O1 leads to a reduction in the regression 
coefficient on real output from 1.00  to .75.  The variability of 
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addition, the variability of employment, as measured by 8, 
increases from .0297 to .0388 (a  31 percent increase).  These 
results are consistent throughout the tables.  The presence of a 
fixed cost of hiring reduces the regression coefficient and the 
variability of the real wage and increases the variability of 
employment. 
The results for the sector-specific shocks show the same 
general pattern; however, the regression coefficients and the 
variation in real wages are smaller, while the variation in 
employment is larger.  For example, comparing simulations  (7)  and 
(8)  to (1)  and  (2) shows that the regression coefficient fell 47 
percent instead of 25 percent when k was increased from 0 to .01. 
Simulations (7)  and  (8)  show that increasing the fixed cost from 
0 to .O1 causes the coefficient of variation for wages to fall 
from .0057 to .0037 (a  37 percent decline), while employment 
variability, as measured by 8, rises from .0460 to .0630  (a 37 
percent increase).  The regression coefficients in this case 
differ from the coefficients of variation because of the 
independence of the shocks to both sectors. 
As seen in table 1, simulations (5)  and  (6),  the real wage and 
variability of employment effects are not sensitive to our choice 
of k.  In fact, the coefficient of variation for the real wage in 
the case of k =  .001 is actually smaller than in the case where k 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm=  .01.8  Throughout the simulations, we find that arbitrarily 
small values of k generate the dampened real wage and 
magnification of employment effects. 
The impact of increasing the production function parameter (a) 
can be seen by examining the difference between simulations (2) 
and (4).  It is clear that the dampening of the real wage and the 
magnification of employment are lessened by increasing a.  This 
result makes sense, since it is the existence of a positive 
producer's surplus, due to the decreasing returns-to-scale 
technology, that gives firms the incentive to pay the fixed cost 
in order to  hire additional workers.  Notice that with fixed 
costs (positive  k), a competitive equilibrium does not exist when 
a =  1.' 
The simulations in table 2, where preferences drive the 
sectoral dispersion, show the same general results.  Simulations 
(11)  and (12)  demonstrate that increasing the fixed cost from 0 
to .O1 leads to a reduction in the regression coefficient on real 
output from 1.0  to .91.  The variability of the real wage then 
falls from .0099 to .0091 (an  8 percent reduction) and the 
variability of 8 increases from .0386 to 0.1819  (a  471 percent 
increase).  In general, we find that the magnification effects 
and the dampening of the real wage are present whether we 
generate sectoral dispersion through differences in the average 
Wage variability increases with k once k is positive 
because the marginal utility of consumption of the S-good is 
increasing with k. 
'  This can be seen from equation (14)  when a =  1 and k =  0. 
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preferences for the two goods.  The latter mechanism, however, 
consistently produces dramatic employment magnification effects. 
IV.  Conclusion 
We attempt to show the effects of a small, fixed hiring cost 
on the relative variability of output, employment, and real wages 
in the face of productivity shocks.  The model presented in 
section 11, although very basic, illustrates that if firms face a 
fixed cost of hiring, then for a given size shock the real wage 
response will be smaller and the employment response will be 
larger than if there were no fixed cost. 
The intuition behind this result is clear.  When a recession 
begins, workers leave the sector most affected by the recession 
(durable  goods) for the service sector.  As more workers relocate 
(0 increases), the return to hiring an additional worker rises. 
As the number of firms hiring increases, the tendency for the 
real wage to fall in the high-demand sector (services) is 
dampened (increasing  h decreases 0/h, which leads to an increase 
in the real wage).  This leads to a further rise in the number of 
workers moving from the low-demand sector to the high-demand 
sector, which leads to a further dampening of the real wage.  At 
the same time, the outflow of workers from the low-demand sector 
mitigates the wage decline in that sector. 
As stated in the introduction, the results of this analysis 
suggest a possible mechanism for generating increased employment 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmvariability and decreased real wage variability within an RBC 
framework.  In order to do this, the model must be extended to 
incorporate some dynamic elements.  Although we are still in the 
process of formulating this extension, we anticipate that a 
dynamic version of this model will yield similar results.  In 
addition, a dynamic version will yield different implications for 
the adjustment of employment and wages to permanent versus 
transitory productivity shocks.  The firm is most likely to incur 
the fixed cost of hiring (and the worker is most likely to move) 
if the shock is perceived to be permanent.  In that case, we 
expect to observe the dampened real wage and the magnification of 
employment effects.  This would make sense, since the model 
presented here considers only permanent shocks.  Thus, a possible 
way to test for this effect would be to examine the differential 
response of real wages to permanent versus transitory changes in 
productivity.  Our model predicts that the real wage response to 
a permanent productivity shock will be less than the real wage 
response to a temporary productivity shock. 
In addition to adding dynamics, any extension of this 
framework should also consider adding leisure to the utility 
function.  This would reinforce the effects illustrated above, 
because there would then be two sources of adjustment to a given 
shock: movements in and out of the labor force and movements from 
one sector of the economy to the other. 
Our model generates the dampening real wage and magnification 
of employment effects within a sectoral-shifts framework.  The 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbasic results, however, could easily be generated in a more 
general framework in which individuals face the choice of not 
working (producing in the household sector) or working in the 
production sector.  In such a framework, a positive productivity 
shock to the production sector will cause individuals to leave 
the household sector.  As individuals flow into the labor force, 
more firms will find it worthwhile to hire workers, leading to an 




Normalizing 6,  =  1, the first order conditions  (8)-(13) can 
be solved to yield two equations and two unknowns Z and h, where 
z  =  0/h: 
Given values for N, a, y, 6, e,,  and q, equation (Al)  is 
solved using Newton's method  (see  Press [1988]).  The value of Z 
that solves equation  (Al)  is then plugged into equation (A2). 
Next we apply Newton's method to (A2)  to obtain solutions for Z 
and h, which are then used to calculate wages, employment, and 
output. 
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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2:  Preferences 
(y =  1.2) 
I.  Aggregate Shocks 
E,  =  2 +  .05-ran1 
E,  =  1 +  O2.l.ranl 
Regression 
Coefficient of Variation  Coefficient on Y 
11. Sectoral Shocks 
E,  =  1 +  .O5.ranl 
E,  =  1 +  0.l.ranl 
Regression 















Source: Authorsf simulations. 
Wage 
0.0099 
0.0091 
0.0098 
0.0097 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
8 
0.100 
0.5965 
0.1008 
0.1365 
Y 
0.0099 
0.0099 
0.0098 
0.0098 
k 
0 
.01 
0 
.O1 
Wage/Y 
1.0 
0.92 
1.0 
0.95 
8 
0.0386 
0.1819 
0.0384 
0.0492 
a 
0.5 
0.5 
0.9 
0.9 
Wage 
1.0 
0.71 
1.0 
0.94 
Wage/Y 
1.0 
0.91 
1.0 
0.98 
Wage 
0.0068 
0.0064 
0.0066 
0.0064 
Wage 
1.0 
0.91 
1.0 
0.98 
Y 
0.0068 
0.0069 
0.0066 
0.0066 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm